There is increasing evidence that export diversification is linked to growth. However, possibly less than 10 African countries show signs of export diversification, with manufacturing making up at least 25% of total exports. Botswana and Zambia are both heavily reliant on primary commodity exports. In Zambia, the dominance of copper was such that only 6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was manufacturing at independence in 1964 – 90% of export revenues were with copper. Zambia has had two main eras of economic policy since independence, with a central planning approach in the first period. In 1991 Zambia evolved to a market economy model. Policies and the role of government differed – from that of investor to facilitator – but the outcome was similar: mineral exports have remained high and dominate the portfolio of goods exported.
In 1997 the EU introduced a requirement that beef imports be traceable through a computerised system. To ensure continued access to the EU market, Botswana introduced the livestock identification and traceback system (LITS). The objectives of this study are to estimate the costs associated with implementing the system and determine the effects on Botswana's beef exports to the EU market, government's export revenue from the beef sub-sector, and cattle producers' incomes and rural employment in the cattle industry.
The objectives of financial sector reform in Uganda were interest liberalisation, reducing directed credit, improving prudential regulation, privatisating financial intermediaries, reducing reserve requirements, liberalisation of securities markets and pro-competition measures. Interest rate liberalisation focused on positive interest rates, with rates linked to the weighted average of an auction-based treasury bill, followed by full liberalisation in 1994. To increase competition, entry barriers were lowered in 1991 but this was followed by a moratorium on new banks that was lifted only in 2005. Reserve requirements for commercial banks were raised in 2000 following collapses in the 1990s and in 2004. Directed credit and credit ceilings were gradually removed but re-introduced using European Union funding in the late 1990s to support selected sectors, emphasising export production. Other reforms included privatisation with government divesting its stake in commercial banks in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1991, penalties were introduced for non-compliant banks and supervision was aligned with Basel 1. Legal and regulatory reforms to enhance the Bank of Uganda's authority started in 1993. Legislation governing microfinance institutions was introduced in 2003 followed by the Financial Institutions Act in 2004 with new regulations. In 1996 the Capital Markets Authority was established followed by the licensing of the Uganda Securities Exchange. Treasury bonds were introduced in 2004. Liberalising the exchange rate began in 1986 with a dual rate replacing the fixed rate, followed by a parallel foreign exchange market in 1992 marking the transition to a market-based system. This was followed by an inter-bank foreign exchange market, liberalisation of the current account and then capital account in 1997. Financial development can be assessed using the ratios of M2 money supply to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), M3 to GDP and domestic credit to GDP. From 1983 - 2008, M2 and M3 to GDP showed an initial sharp upwards trend followed by a decline and then a steady increase. Domestic credit to the private sector has not matched growth in the M2 and M3 shares of GDP. For instance from 1983-2008 M2 and M3 grew by 13% and 15% respectively while private sector credit grew by 11%. Deposit and lending rates rose from 9% and 15% in 1983 to 32% and 40% in 1989, with the spread widening to 15% in 1987. They then dipped, rose again and fell to about 8% and 20% in 1995, remaining at about those levels until the present. The inflation rate reflected these movements rising from about 25% in 1984 to a peak of 190% in 1998, driven by excess money supply, and then declining to single digit levels from 1994.
The quest for new sources of energy away from traditional petroleum products has in recent times led to the development and use of biological material (biomass). As the name suggests, biofuels are developed from organic materials. Thus an increase in the price of oil has also increased demand for biofuels, resulting in a high correlation between agricultural commodities* prices, particularly maize, and energy prices. While escalating petroleum prices are one reason for the quest for other sources of energy, this is not the only factor. The search for alternative sources of energy was underscored by environmental concerns and energy security concerns in the US and European Union countries about their reliance on oil from a few countries. The use of food products to generate fuel has raised concerns that this will raise prices of essential food items for poor households – and experts agree that biofuel production has affected the cost of food. Estimates range from a conservative estimate of 2%-3% by the US Department of Agriculture to 70%- 75% in a study done by Mitchell (2008)**. Has this increased production of biofuels resulted in a shortage of food supplies at the household level? Has that shortage – perceived or real — resulted in a permanent increase in prices thus threatening food security for poor households? Assuming that increased biofuels production threatens poor households' food supplies, what policy choices are available to governments in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)? biofuels production on maize prices, how the rise in maize prices affected low-income groups in SACU, and whether and when exportable maize surpluses are likely in South Africa.
Southern African Development Community (SADC) members signed the Trade Protocol in 1996, however progress in the region to reap the benefits purported to accompany regional economic integration appears limited. Although SADC has adopted a growth and development through trade strategy, indications are that more needs to be done to implement this in a way that yields more positive results.
Evidence based policy making is critical for developing sound and relevant government policies. The process of evidence based policy making by definition allows one to monitor specific variables to determine the efficacy of a government intervention. Accurate data and sound data analysis are needed to achieve particular objectives.
This note highlights the pattern of South Africa, European Union and Asia trade over the period 1990-2009. The note pays particular attention to trade flow changes between South Africa and the EU and compares these to the changes in the trade flows between South Africa and Asia. The note also looks at the changes that have occurred within the Asian region, taking a closer look at sub-regions in Asia, namely, Eastern Asia, South Central Asia, South Eastern Asia, and Western Asia.
The trade trends reveal that South Africa's imports have been slowly increasing dominated by Asia. Similarly Asia, in particular East Asia, has emerged as South Africa's major trade partner, dethroning the European Union as an export destination.
With regards to imports, China has, over the years, rose to become a significant exporter to South Africa. The same can be said for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, Japan, India, Pakistan and Singapore have lost ground in terms of preference as import sources. Germany and the United Kingdom remained South Africa most important export markets, although the two countries' share of South Africa exports declined.
On closer inspection, there is evidence to suggest that a number of traditional European Union imports commodities that were ranked as in the top ten exports to South Africa that have been replaced by Asian imports and these include; HS27: Mineral fuels, Oil, distillation products, etc.; HS29: Organic chemicals; HS39: Plastics and articles thereof; HS71: Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal & articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin; HS73: Articles of iron or steel and HS85: Electrical, electronic equipment.
This research note shows that the EU is a significant trading partner to South Africa. Over the years the EU has been South Africa's largest trading block. Post 2005, Asia became a crucial trading partner to South Africa, and based on the previous trends, expectations are for Asia to surpass the EU in terms of value of trade within the next decade.
For many African states, negotiations to liberalise trade in services is a relatively new experience. Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and East African Community (EAC) member states are set to negotiate services at several levels – regional, bilateral, multilateral and even at the supra-regional level in the context of the Tripartite agreements.
Trade in services is not a feature of the 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement, and although the Heads of State and Government hinted at the possibility when they undertook to develop “SACU positions on new generation issues”, it is unlikely that services will be negotiated in the context of SACU any time soon. SACU member states already have to contend with bilateral services negotiations with the European Union (EU) (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland), regional negotiations as part of SADC (all five SACU member states), regional negotiations as part of COMESA (Swaziland) and even at the supra-regional level as part of the Tripartite negotiations. This is already ambitious, particularly for a country with limited capacity such as Swaziland. These negotiations are mostly focused on services liberalisation, which addresses regulatory barriers relating to the access and treatment of foreign services suppliers. If SACU member states feel the need to directly address the issue of services within the configuration, the basis of the discussion should be deeper integration. With deeper integration, the focus should be shifted from liberalising the barriers that exist at the borders, towards addressing the behind-the-border issues, which exist within the jurisdiction of the member states.
David Kaplan is currently Professor of Business Government Relations and Professor of Economics at the University of Cape Town.
He has worked extensively on industrial policy. From 200 – 2003 he was chief economist of the Department of Trade and Industry; From 2004 -2011 he worked part time as chief economist for the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, in the Western Cape Provincial Government.
His work on innovation includes being the coordinator of the task team that produced the Green Paper on Science and Technology (S&T), December 1996; engaging in the White Paper on S&T, June 1996; panel member for two Five Year Reviews of the CSIR; member of the National Advisory Council on Innovation, 1998 – 2004. He provided input into the Ministerial Committee on Science and Technology (2011-2012) and is currently a member of the board of the Technology Innovation Agency.
Recently he has undertaken work for the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; and Business Leadership South Africa. He has also co- published, with Mike Morris and Raphie Kaplinsky, a book on commodities and industrialisation in Africa: One Thing Leads to Another. Promoting Industrialisation by Making the Most of the Commodity Boom in Sub-Saharan Africa.
He has BA BComm (UCT), MA (Kent) and DPhil (Sussex).
Call for papers:
TRAPCA is therefore calling for papers addressing the following themes for the Trade
policy Forum 2011.
1) The Turn towards Regional and Bilateral Agreements
This session will track the trend towards regional and bilateral trade agreements and seek
to account for their rise and consider its implications for African countries. Would deeper
integration among African countries and with other non-African countries ensure their
increased participation in the multilateral trading system?
2) Ramifications of the Stalemate in the Doha Negotiations for African Countries
Papers under this session will explore the potential benefits that could be realized by
African Countries if the Doha Round is successfully concluded. With the stalemate in
the negotiations and expected rise in the number of bilateral and regional trade
agreements, what would be the impact on the preferences enjoyed by African countries in
their key markets? Would this trend compromise efforts aimed at alleviating poverty in
Africa?
3) Compatibility of African Regional and Bilateral Agreements with WTO
Commitments
Papers under this session will examine the extent to which commitments made in
bilateral and regional trade agreements between African and non-African trade partners
are consistent with their WTO commitments, particularly in light of Article XXIV of the
GATT 1994 and Article V of the GATS. What is the impact, if any, of the proposed
MFN clauses in some of the agreements under negotiation?
4) Aid for Trade and Funding Mechanisms in Economic Partnership Agreements
Papers in this session will consider the extent to which aid for trade and funding
mechanisms in Economic Partnership Agreements are available and as such serving as
incentives to finalize EPA negotiations. Are these compensatory mechanisms adequate
to offset the losses that would be incurred by the entering into a reciprocal trading
arrangement with the European Communities?
5) Trade and Exchange Rates
Papers in this session will consider the impact of exchange rate policies on international
trade. It would seek to address whether devaluation or undervaluation of a country's
currency affect terms of trade and if so, what would be the most optimal policy for
African countries?
6) Eligibility Requirements in AGOA and Other Preferential Trade Agreements
Papers in this session will consider the types of eligibility requirements in the African
Growth and Opportunity Act as well as other preferential trade agreements, including
rules of origin and non-trade related requirements and the impact of such requirements on
access to developed-country markets.